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Introduction
The Supreme Court generally gives wide berth to the Federal Circuit in patent cases.
Despite sharp discord on the Federal Circuit itself' and consternation among the district judges2
on the fundamental topic of patent claim interpretation, the Supreme Court has remained on the
sidelines.3 In one area, however, the Supreme Court has been vigilant. Twice now the Court has
interceded on the interpretation of a patent statute relating to new drug development.4
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court in Merck v. Integra broadly construed the
safe harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act to make it more difficult to enforce patents
against drug developers.5 Vacating a decision from a divided panel of the Federal Circuit, the
Supreme Court held that the safe harbor extends to "all uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to the development and submission of any information under the FDCA."6
The impact of this decision may be marred, however, by loose ends not addressed by the Court
and by the Court's approval of an unfortunately vague jury instruction.

1 The open disagreement within the Federal Circuit on claim interpretation was displayed again recently in the

dissent by Judges Meyer and Newman in the en banc decision in Phillips v. A WH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2005). "What we have wrought is the substitution of a black box, as it so pejoratively has been said of the jury, with
the black hole of this court. Out of this void we emit 'legal' pronouncements by way of 'interpretive necromancy';
these rulings resemble reality, if at all, only by chance." Phillips,415 F.3d at 1330 (note omitted). "Eloquent words
can mask much mischief. The court's opinion today is akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic
the
orchestra is playing as if nothing is amiss, but the ship is still heading for Davey Jones' locker." Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1334-35.
2 See Hon. Kathleen M. O'Malley, Hon. Patti Saris, & Hon. Ronald H Whyte, The Law, Technology and the
Arts

Symposium: The Past, Present and Future of the FederalCircuit: A Panel Discussion: Claim Constructionfrom
the Perspectiveof the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 671 (Spring 2004) ("[T]here seems to be a changing
perspective on how to do claim construction," Judge Saris, p. 678; "I have jokingly said that perhaps litigants
should want to be on the losing side at the district court level because there appears to be a presumption at the CAFC
that district court judges generally get claim construction wrong." Judge O'Malley, p. 680; "If the reversal rate is as
high as some claim, the easiest thing to do is figure out what your decision is and then write the opposite," Judge
Whyte, p. 680.).
3 The Supreme Court's last foray into patent claim interpretation was Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996), where the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit, holding that the interpretation of
patent claims is an issue of law to be decided by the judge. In two other recent cases, the Supreme Court has dealt
with the scope of patent claims for purposes of the doctrine of equivalents. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo,
535 U.S. 722, 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117 S. Ct.
1040 (1997). In none of these cases did the Supreme Court address the central issues of claim interpretation that are
now dividing the Federal Circuit and confusing the district judges - how to construe the meaning of terms
appearing in claims, and the relationship between the claims, the specification and the file history, for purposes of
interpreting the claims.
4 The Supreme Court previously construed 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S.

661, 110 S. Ct. 2683 (1990). See discussion infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. A third drug case was taken
by the Court while this article was in press. See Laboratory Corp. of Am. V. Metabolite Lab. Inc., (docket 04-607).
5 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences , Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 162 L. Ed. 2d 160 (2005).
6

Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2380 (emphasis in original).
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I. Background
As of 1984, the patent and pharmaceutical regulatory statutes were out of sync. All new
drugs, both generic and brand-name, were subject to the same rigorous FDA safety and
effectiveness testing - arguably a wasted effort for copycat generic drugs. Patents applicable to
new drugs would often issue long before the drugs were approved for sale by the FDA,' thereby
effectively wasting a portion of market exclusivity at the beginning of the patent term. At the
same time, as a result of the Federal Circuit's decision in the Roche v. Bolar8 case, parties
interested in making and selling generic drugs could not begin FDA testing until the patent for
the brand name drug expired without the risk of being sued for infringement. This resulted in a
defacto extension of the patent term beyond that set by law.
Congress dealt with these problems in "The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act," more commonly known as the "Hatch-Waxman Act." 9 The purpose of HatchWaxman was to strike a balance between the competing interests of brand-name and generic
drug manufacturers by providing incentives to produce new drugs, while offering quick FDA
approval for low cost generic drugs. Hatch-Waxman created a faster approval process for
generic drugs, allowing generic manufacturers to file an "Abbreviated New Drug Application"
("ANDA"), supported only by showing that the generic drug is "the same" as or "bioequivalent"
to an already approved drug.1" This allowed the providers of generics to by-pass the full FDA
safety and effectiveness process and thereby bring less expensive versions of brand name drugs
to market sooner.
Hatch-Waxman also provided a "safe harbor" against patent infringement, effectively
overruling the Roche decision, which held that clinical tests conducted by generic manufacturers
before patent expiration were infringing.'' Hatch-Waxman amended the statutory definition of
patent infringement to exclude activity "reasonably related" to submitting information to the
FDA. 2 As a consequence, the FDA approval for generic drug applications now more closely
coincides with patent expiration, enabling generics to reach the market more quickly.

7 In 1984, the FDA approval process took an average of seven to ten years from the time the patent was issued.

Telectronics PacingSys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1992), citing Innovation and Patent
Law Reform: Hearings on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286, and H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 409
(1984) (statement of Lewis A Engman, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association).
8 Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
9 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 [hereinafter "Hatch-Waxman Act"], Pub. L. No.

98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)-(h) (2000)).
See also FDA Generic Drugs Final Rule Questions and Answers summarizing the rule changes, at http://
www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/generics/qna.html (last visited January 4, 2006).
1o

21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2000).

11Roche, 733 F.2d at 858.
12

35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).

5 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 126

Copyright © 2006, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property

In exchange for allowing faster generic drug approvals, the Act established patent term
extensions for innovator drugs to offset the term used up during the approval process. 3 There
are some limits to the extension: it cannot exceed five years, nor can the period between product
approval and patent expiration exceed fourteen years. 4 The patentee must also act with "due
diligence" throughout the regulatory period. This means they must not delay FDA review, and
anyone can challenge an extension on that basis. 5
The Act also provides a dispute resolution procedure. The ANDA rules offer four routes
for marketing of generic drugs.' 6 Three routes, called Paragraph I, Paragraph II, and Paragraph
III certifications, apply to ANDA filings that do not involve challenges to patents. Through
these routes, multiple generics can enter the market at the same time, creating a very competitive
market. To date, 94% of more than eight thousand ANDA applications filed have used this route
for ANDA filing. 7
The fourth route is called a Paragraph IV certification. 8 It applies when patent protection
has not expired, and the generic drug maker claims that either the patent is invalid or its product
does not infringe the patent. Paragraph IV certifications are desirable because the first to file one
becomes eligible for 180 days of market exclusivity, during which time the FDA will not review
any other generic drug application. However, the rules also provide that filing a Paragraph IV
certification with the FDA is an infringing act.' 9 This allows the patentee an opportunity to sue
the generic manufacturer for patent infringement and obtain an automatic thirty month stay on
FDA approval activities. 0
Recently the Act was amended to close perceived loopholes. 2 ' For example, patentees
are required to list each patent related to a given drug in the FDA publication called "Approved
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations," commonly known as the "Orange
Book." Prior to the amendments to the Act, patentees were required to file notice of a patent in
the Orange Book. Notice of additional patents could be later filed in the Orange Book, gaining

1"35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
1435 U.S.C. § 156 (c)-(d).
1535 U.S.C. § 156.
1621 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
1

CRS Issue Brief for Congress, The Hatch-Waxman Act: ProposedLegislative ChangesAffecting Pharmaceutical

Patents at 2 (Jan. 5, 2004), at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/IB 10105.pdf (last
visited January 4, 2006).
" 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
'9 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
20 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
21 The

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173 (2003) (codified in various provisions of 21

U.S.C. § 355).
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the opportunity for additional stay periods. Under the amendments to the Act, only a single
automatic stay is allowed.22
The amendments also give generic companies the ability to seek the de-listing of patents
that are inappropriately listed in the Orange Book, such as drug packaging, drug metabolites, and
intermediate forms of a drug. 23 They also clarify that multiple 180-day exclusivity periods will
be given if multiple applicants file on the same day,24 and that the exclusivity period will be lost
if marketing is not timely pursued.25
II. The Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
The provision of the Act intended to permit infringement-free FDA-related research and
testing is an amendment to the statute defining infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271, by adding a new

subpart "(e)(1)," which provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United
States or import into the United States any patented invention . . . . solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 26
As stated above, this statute was prompted by the result in Roche v. Bolar. In that case, a
generic drug manufacturer acquired a small quantity of a patented compound to obtain data
needed for a New Drug Application to be filed with the FDA. The patent covering the
compound was within six months of expiration, but the patent holder nonetheless sued for
infringement and sought a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to enjoin the testing. After
granting the TRO requested by Roche, the trial court subsequently ruled on the merits in favor of
See, e.g., FDA Generic Drugs Final Rule Questions and Answers summarizing the rule changes, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/generics/qna.html (last visited January 4, 2006). See also, 21 CFR
314.94(a)(12)(vi) (2005iv) ("If a patent on the listed drug is issued and the holder of the approved application for the
listed drug does not submit the required information on the patent within 30 days of issuance of the patent, an
applicant who submitted an abbreviated new drug application for that drug that contained an appropriate patent
certification before the submission of the patent information is not required to submit an amended certification.").
23 See, e.g., FDA Generic Drugs Final Rule Questions and Answers summarizing the rule changes, at
http://www.fda.gox/oc/initiatives/generics/qna.html (last visited January 4, 2006). See also, 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(C)(ii)(I) ("If an owner of the patent or the holder of the approved application under subsection (b) of this
section for the drug that is claimed by the patent or a use of which is claimed by the patent brings a patent
infringement action against the applicant, the applicant may assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the
holder to correct or delete the patent information submitted by the holder under subsection (b) of this section or this
subsection on the ground that the patent does not claim either
(aa) the drug for which the application was
approved; or (bb) an approved method of using the drug.").
24 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb) ("As used in this subsection, the term "first applicant" means an applicant
that, on the first day on which a substantially complete application containing a certification described in paragraph
(2)(A)(vii)(IV) is submitted for approval of a drug, submits a substantially complete application that contains and
lawfully maintains a certification described in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV) for the drug.").
25 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D) ("the term "forfeiture event", with respect to an application under this subsection, means
the occurrence of any of the following: (I) Failure to market. .
26 35 U.S.C § 271(e)(1).
22
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the accused infringer Bolar, on the basis that the accused activity was not infringing because it
was de minimis and experimental. 7 A prompt appeal was taken and the Federal Circuit sided
with the patent holder. The court rejected arguments that the activity was de minimis28 or that it
constituted non-infringing experimental use, and ruled that the FDA-necessitated testing
constituted infringing "use" of the patented invention under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The safe harbor
provision of § 271(e)(1) was tailored to overrule Roche by carving activities reasonably related
to FDA approval out of the definition of infringement.
Section 271(e)(1) was initially reviewed by the Supreme Court in Eli Lilly v. Medtronic,
wherein the Court considered the distinction between drugs and medical devices.2 9 In Eli Lilly,
the issue was whether activities undertaken by Medtronic in the course of FDA-related testing of
an implantable cardiac defibrillator were covered by the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1). Justice
Scalia authored the opinion for the majority of a divided Court. 3' Relying on the purpose of §
271 (e)(1) in the context of the other aspects of Hatch Waxman, the majority in Eli Lilly, ruled in
favor of Medtronic. Although it found the statute inelegantly drafted,3' the Court held that the
statute applies to the entirety of any Federal Act, at least some portion of which regulates drugs.
Because the FDCA is such an Act and because the FDCA regulates medical devices as well as
drugs, the majority in Lilly reasoned that the protection of §271(e)(1) applies to FDA-related
testing of medical devices as well as drugs.3 2
Not long after Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit further broadened the safe harbor in
Telectronics v. Ventritex.3 3 The issue was whether data could be used for business purposes in
addition to FDA uses, and still maintain protection under § 271(e)(1). In that case, the accused
infringer, Ventritex, had conducted clinical trials of its implantable defibrillator pursuant to an
Investigational Device Exemption from the FDA, and used the results of the clinical trials to
raise investment money.34
Ventritex had reported on the results of their clinical testing to

27 Roche, 733 F.2d at 860-61.
28 The Federal Circuit has taken a very dim view of the de minimis defense to patent infringement. Embrex Inc. v.

Service Eng'g. Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2000), Rader, J. concurring ("Since its inception, this court
has not tolerated the notion that a little infringement de minimis infringement is acceptable or not infringement
at all... [T]he statute leaves no leeway to excuse infringement because the infringer only infringed a little.").
29 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 110 S. Ct. 2683 (1990).
30

Dissenting Justices Kennedy and White would have limited the safe harbor of §271 (e)(1) to drugs, not including

medical devices, based on what they considered a literal reading of the statute. Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 679-80, 110 S.
Ct.at 2693.
31 "No interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform §271 (e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory

draftmanship. To construe it as the Court of Appeals decided, one must posit a good deal of legislative imprecision;
but to construe is as petitioner would, one must posit that and an implausible substantive intent as well." Id. at 679,
110 S. Ct. at 2693.
32

Id.

33 Telectronics PacingSys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
34 Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1521.
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investors and analysts, and had included a description of the clinical testing and the results in a
private placement memorandum sent to potential investors."
The patent holder, Telectronics, argued that using the clinical testing for fund raising
activities was unrelated to FDA reporting requirements, and that by such unrelated use, the
activities "lost" their otherwise exempt status under § 271(e)(1). 3 6 The Federal Circuit ruled that
the safe harbor was not impaired by the fact that the exempt activities were used for "fundraising
and other business purposes.

37

In AbTox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether the §
271 (e)(1) infringement exemption applies to different classes of medical devices.38 In AbTox, the
device at issue was a plasma sterilizer, which is a Class II medical device.39 In contrast, the
device that had been at issue in Eli Lilly, an implantable cardiac defibrillator, was a Class III
device. Class II devices, unlike Class III devices, can be marketed without advance FDA
approval.4" There is an FDA approval process for Class II devices, but it is "by no means
comparable" to the pre-market approval necessary for Class III devices.4" Also, Class III devices
are eligible for patent term extensions under 35 U.S.C. § 156, whereas Class II devices are not.
Judge Rader, writing for the panel in AbTox, noted that the rationale for the Supreme
Court's ruling in Eli Lilly was not applicable to Class II devices.42 Nonetheless, he felt
constrained to follow the broad holding of Eli Lilly and the Federal Circuit ruled the safe harbor
applicable to all classes of medical devices.43

35id.
36

Id. at 1523.

Id.at 1525 ("By permitting the testing and regulatory approval process to begin well before a controlling patent
had run its course, Congress must have intended to allow competitors to be in a position to market their products as
soon as it was legally permissible.... If Congress intended to make that more difficult, if not impossible, by
preventing competitors from using, in an admittedly non-infringing manner, the derived test data for fund raising
and other business purposes, it would have made that intent clear. The statute contains no such provision.").
38AbTox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
37

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994), classifies medical devices in
three categories. Class I devices present no unreasonable risk of illness or injury and are subject to only "general
controls." Class II devices are potentially more harmful than Class I devices. Class 11devices may be marketed
without advance FDA approval, but they must comply with FDA performance regulations known as "special
controls." Class III devices, which cannot be marketed without advance FDA approval, are devices which either
"present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury" or are "purported or represented to be for a use in
supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of
human health." See discussion in Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1028, citing Medtronic,Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477, 116 S.
Ct. 2240, 2246 (1996).
40
Abtox, 122 F.3d at 1028.
39

41

id.

42

[d. at 1029.

4,"Ultimately,

this court must follow the Supreme Court's broader holding, which remains in force despite a
potential conflict with its own narrower reasoning." Id.
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The case law, therefore, from both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, had taken
a uniformly broad approach to interpreting § 271 (e)(1). The courts had held that the safe harbor
of Hatch-Waxman was applicable to all classes of medical devices as well as drugs, whether or
not FDA pre-approval was necessary, and that the erstwhile infringing activity, rendered noninfringing by the statute, could be used for marketing, fundraising and other business purposes.
III. Merck v. Integra
An issue left unresolved by the cases and the statute itself was the scope of activity
protected by the safe harbor of 35 U.S.C § 271(e)(1). The statutory language, "solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information [to the FDA]," leaves room
for debate. To understand the debate requires some understanding of the drug screening process.
Generally speaking, potential drugs are screened in a protein assay to identify those
chemicals that provide a desired change in protein activity. These screens are called "High
Throughput Screening" or "HTS" because typically hundreds of thousands of different chemicals
are tested in the screen. Chemicals that produce the desired change in protein activity are called
"leads." Once a "lead" compound is identified, it usually must be optimized for solubility,
toxicology, and the like, before being declared an official drug "candidate." Candidates then
undergo clinical testing, and the lucky winner to survive that obstacle course eventually becomes
an FDA approved drug.
Although not addressed by either the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court, the scope of
activities subject to the safe harbor had been interpreted broadly by the district courts in recent
decisions. District courts in Massachusetts,4 4 the Southern District of New York,45 and
Delaware46 had found the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) applicable to pre-clinical development of
new drugs. This trend was reversed by the Federal Circuit in the Integrav. Merck case.
Beginning in 1988, Merck KGaA (Merck) funded research on angiogenesis by a scientist,
Dr. David Cheresh, at the Scripps Research Institute (Scripps). Angiogenesis, the process of
growing new blood vessels, plays a critical role in several diseases including solid tumor cancers,
diabetic retinopathy, and rheumatoid arthritis. 47 Dr. Cheresh discovered that by blocking special
molecules called "integrins" on the surface of cells, he could stem the growth of new blood
vessels.48 Initially, Dr. Cheresh used a monoclonal antibody in his angiogenesis research, but
later he began using a peptide called EMD 66203, which was provided to him by Merck.49

44

Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).

45 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2001).
46

Nexell Therapeutics,Inc. v. AmCell Corp., 199 F. Supp.2d 197 (D. Del. 2002).

47 Merck KGaA v. IntegraLifesciences ,Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2378, 162 L.Ed.2d 160 (2005).
48

Telios Pharm., Inc. v. Merck KGaA, No. 96-CV-1307, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24187, at *3 (S.D. Cal.A 1997CA).

49 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2378.
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EMD 66203, which is covered by Integra's patents," is a specific variant of the "RGD"
peptide a three amino acid peptide containing arginine-glycine-aspartate that had been looped
round so that the front end joined the back end and was thus "cyclized." The cyclic RGD binds
to the integrins on the cell surface, thus blocking the growth of new blood vessels and making
the peptide useful to slow tumor growth. Dr. Cheresh's discoveries were published in medical
journals and in the general media in 1994."'
Merck's initial agreement to fund Dr. Cheresh's angiogenesis research was set to expire
in July 1995. Merck entered into a new three-year agreement with Scripps in February 1995,
providing for in vitro and in vivo testing of RGD peptides, and calling for submission of an
Investigation New Drug application (IND) to the FDA in the third year. It was agreed that once
a primary candidate for clinical testing was "in the pipeline," Merck would perform the
toxicology tests necessary for FDA approval. 3
Dr. Cheresh focused on the EMD 66203 peptide and two closely related derivatives
called EMD 85189 and EMD 121974. 54 Dr. Cheresh tested the efficacy, specificity, and toxicity
of the three peptides as angiogenesis inhibitors, including testing in animals.5 He ultimately
determined that EMD 121974 was the best candidate for testing in humans, and an IND was
eventually filed in 1998.56
However, Integra sued Merck, Scripps and Dr. Cheresh for patent infringement in July of
1996 in the Southern District of California. The complaint alleged that Merck induced
infringement of Integra's patents by supplying the RGD peptide to Scripps, 57 and that Scripps
and Dr. Cheresh infringed by using the RGD peptide in their angiogenesis experiments." The
defendants contended that they did not infringe and that in any event the accused activities were
protected by the common law research exception and by the FDA exception codified at 35
59
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that all the accused activities
since at least September 1995 were covered by the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1). Integra argued
50

Before the Supreme Court, Merck KGaA did not contest that the EMD 66203 peptide was covered by the Integra

patents. 125 S. Ct. at 2378, n. 3. Integra had performed the original research that identified RGD as the important
part of a cell surface protein that promoted cell adhesion, and had obtained five patents related to the RGD peptide.
Integra v. Merck KGaA, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, **3-4.
51Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2378.
52

id.

53 Id.
54 Id.

55Id.
56

Id.

57 U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,988,621 ("the '621 patent"), 4,792,525 ("the '525 patent"), 5,695,997 ("the '997 patent"),

4,879,237 ("the '237 patent"), and 4,789,734 ("the '734 patent").
58 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2379.
59

Id.
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that the motion should be denied on the basis that § 271(e)(1) applies only to applications for
generic drug versions of FDA-approved "pioneer" drugs already in the marketplace. 6' The trial
court, citing Eli Lilly and AbTox, ruled that § 271(e)(1) is not limited to testing for generic
drugs, 6' and noted that at least one District Court had applied § 271(e)(1) to an IND
application.6 2 However, despite holding that the defendants' conduct was "eligible for the §
271(e)(1) exception," the trial court found that material issues still existed as to "when
defendants' conduct became exempt," and the motion for summary judgment was denied.63
The case proceeded to jury trial before District Senior Judge James M. Fitzgerald of the
District of Alaska, sitting in the Southern District of California. At the conclusion of the
evidence, the court ruled that, with one exception, Merck's pre-1995 activities were covered
under the common-law research exemption. 64 The court ruled, however, that whether the post1995 activities fell within the protection of § 271(e)(1) must be submitted to the jury, who
returned a verdict finding that the defendants infringed four of the asserted patents, and that the
activities were not protected by § 271(e)(1). 65 Fifteen million dollars in damages were awarded
against Merck, the only defendant against whom damages were sought. 66 Post-trial, the judge
dismissed Scripps and Dr. Cheresh, but entered judgment against Merck on the jury verdict of
infringement and damages.67
On appeal, a divided panel comprised of Judges Rader, Prost, and Newman, with Judge
Rader writing for the majority and Judge Newman dissenting, affirmed the judgment of
infringement.68 Judge Rader's opinion for the panel majority took a decidedly narrow view of the
scope of activities protected by § 271(e)(1). He relied heavily on the legislative history as
showing an intention to facilitate generics to enter the market for sale of patented drugs upon
expiration of the patent.6 9 He quoted a House Committee report describing the protected premarket activity as "a limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the
bioequivalency of a generic substitute," and he concluded that "the express objective of the 1984
Act was to facilitate the immediate entry of safe, effective generic drugs into the

60 Telios Pharm., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24187 at *7.
61 Id.

at *9.

62

Id. at * 10, citing NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202, 204 (D.N.J. 1994).

63

Id. at *13.

64

Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2379. The ruling of the trial court applying the common law research exception to Dr.

Cheresh's pre-1995 activities does not appear to comport with the limited scope of that exception as held in Madey
v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). That ruling was apparently not challenged on appeal, but the theory
was abandoned by the defendants, probably as a result of the Madey case.
65 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2379.
66 [d.

67 The basis for the post-trial dismissal of Scripps and Dr. Cheresh is not indicated in the published opinions of this

case. Prior to trial, Integra had limited its request for relief against those two parties to declaratory relief. Integra,
331 F.3d 860 at 863.
68 The Federal Circuit reversed the damages award and remanded the case for a recalculation of damages. Id at 872.
69

Id. at 865.
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marketplace upon expiration of a pioneer drug patent."7 In this case, none of the factors noted
by Judge Rader in the legislative history were present: Merck and Scripps were not generic drug
manufacturers, their activities were not aimed at quickly bringing a generic version of a patented
drug to market upon expiration of a patent, and the activity itself was much more basic than
bioequivalency testing.71 Plainly, Judge Rader believed that neither the parties nor the activities
they were engaged in were the intended beneficiaries of the safe harbor.
Judge Rader framed the issue as whether the statute "reaches back down the chain of
experimentation to embrace development and identification of new drugs that will, in turn, be
subject to FDA approval."72 While acknowledging the Eli Lilly holding that the statute is not
limited to generics, Judge Rader stated that, because the focus is on the provision requiring the
transfer of information to the FDA, applying the statute to "[a]ctivities that do not directly
produce information for the FDA... already strain[s] the relationship to the central purpose of
the safe harbor."73 He termed the statute a "de minimis encroachment on the rights of the
patentee." Although the opinion did not state precisely where in the "chain of experimentation"
the statutory protection commences, it rejected an interpretation that "would encompass drug
development activities far beyond those necessary
to acquire information for FDA approval of a
75
patented pioneer drug already on the market.
The panel majority characterized the activities of the defendants as "general biomedical
research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds, 76 and outside the scope of § 271(e)(1).
The Federal Circuit seemed to identify the Scripps-Merck research as mere drug "identification,"
because they tested three compounds, and only selected one for further study, stating: "The
Scripps-Merck experiments did not supply information for submission to the United States Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), but instead identified the best drug candidate to subject to
future clinical testing under the FDA processes." '7
There is also language in the opinion suggesting that the exemption does not include
"pre-clinical" research, such as animal research.7 8 This is significant because animal studies are
the basis for clinical studies in humans. Under the panel majority's interpretation of the statute,
70

Id. at 865-866.

71Id.
72

at 867-868.

Id. at 866.

73id.
74

Id. at 867.

75 id.
76

Integra, 331 F.3d 860 at 866 ("In this case, the Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not clinical testing to

supply information to the FDA, but only general biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds.
The FDA has no interest in the hunt for drugs that may or may not later undergo clinical testing for FDA
approval.").
77Id.
78

"This court has not considered the question arising in this case, namely, whether the pre-clinical research

conducted under the Scripps-Merck agreement is exempt from liability for infringement of Integra's patents under §
271 (e)(1)." Id.
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new drugs could never get past the first three years of pre-clinical testing to get to human testing
without risking patent infringement, injunction and/or damages.
The Federal Circuit panel's decision in Merck was clearly a retrenchment. Although the
decision did not expressly limit the safe harbor to generic drugs, the opinion left open how, if at
all, the safe harbor could apply to activity in preparation for a New Drug Application. Although
the court acknowledged the substantial burden posed by the cumulative number of licenses a
drug developer may be required to obtain,7 9 a result of the panel's decision would be to increase
that number. The panel's decision also served to disadvantage drug companies in the United
States in comparison to those in certain foreign countries, where more patent protection for drug
research is available. 80
The importance of the Federal Circuit's narrow construction of the testing covered by the
safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) is heightened by the unavailability of the common law "research use
defense." In the distant past, there was an exception to patent infringement where the use was
for research or purely experimental purposes. In 1813, Justice Story in Whittemore v. Cutter first
articulated a research use exception, using the now anachronistic term "philosophical" instead of
scientific. Justice Story stated, "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to
punish a man, who constructed such a [patented] machine merely for philosophical experiments,
or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described
effects."8 Although mere dictum, this observation provided the impetus for judicial recognition
of an experimental use defense.
While this defense had been rarely used and was modest in its application, the Federal
Circuit nevertheless signaled its effective demise in Madey v. Duke,82 decided a year before the
Integra case. In Madey, the court held the research use exception only applies when activity is
not in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business, but must be "solely for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry." 3 Thus, the court
remanded the case, suggesting that Duke University might not qualify for the defense, even
though it was a non-profit research institution because it was furthering legitimate business
purposes, including "educating and enlightening students and faculty . . . [and increasing] the
status of the institution and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty."84 Under such a
high standard, it is unlikely that any enterprise can qualify for the experimental use defense,
making the Merck case and the scope of the § 271 (e)(1) exception even more important.
Merck was denied rehearing and rehearing en banc in the Federal Circuit, prompting a
petition for writ of certiorariin the Supreme Court, which was granted. 5 The Court vacated the
79

Id. at 871.
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See, e.g., Jennifer A. Johnson, The Experimental Use Exception in Japan: A Modelfor U.S. PatentLaw?, 12 PAC.

RIM L. & POL'Y J.& Policy 499 (2003).
81 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
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Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
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[d.
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KGaA, 125 S. Ct. 823, 160 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2005).
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Federal Circuit's decision and in doing so, took a very different approach to the interpretation of
§ 271(e)(1).16 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, rejected the view taken by Judge
Rader, which had focused on the statute as directed toward the generic drug approval process.
Pulling no punches, Justice Scalia described the Federal Circuit's statement that the FDA
"had no interest in the hunt for drugs that may or may not later undergo clinical testing for FDA
approval" as "disregard[ing] ...reality. '8 7 He directly rejected two basic premises of the Federal
Circuit's opinion: "Congress did not limit § 271(e)(1)'s safe harbor to the development of
information for inclusion in a submission to the FDA; nor did it create an exemption applicable
only to the research relevant to filing an ANDA for approval of a generic drug.""8 He also
rejected the idea that animal testing is not included in the exemption. 9
The Supreme Court construed § 271(e)(1) broadly as providing safe harbor for "all uses
of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission of any
information under the FDCA."9' Although the Court did not say exactly where "on the road to
regulatory approval" the protection of § 271(e)(1) begins, 9 the Court did provide the following
guidance:
At least where a drug-maker has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented
compound may work, through a particular biological process, to produce a particular
physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that, if successful, would be
appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is 'reasonably related' to the
'development and submission of information under... Federal law' ....
The Court also made clear that the test for protection under the statute does not
necessarily include a requirement that the results of experiments with a patented compound be
included in a submission to the FDA. 93 The Court accepted the proposition that, especially
during the preclinical stage, it will not always be clear what kinds of information and in what
quantities, will be needed to win FDA approval.94
In short, the Supreme Court demolished the rough equivalence that the Federal Circuit
had attempted to make between the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) and generic drug testing. The
Supreme Court interpreted the statute as applying to "any" testing "reasonably related" to the

86

Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. 2372, 162 L. Ed. 2d 160 (2005).

17

Id. at 2382.

" Id.at 2383.
' 9 Id. at 2381.
90 Id. at 2380 (emphasis in original).
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1d. at 2383.
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93 Id.
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id.
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FDA approval process, even where the data is not ultimately submitted to the FDA (as in the
case of a failed drug lead or candidate).95
Aside from the main part of the Supreme Court's decision, which addresses § 271(e)(1)
substantively, one aspect of this decision that may have significant and unforeseen practical
importance in future trials is the Court's comments on the jury instruction, an issue not discussed
in the Federal Circuit's opinion. The trial court's instruction to the jury is reprinted in its entirety
in the Supreme Court's decision:
To prevail on this defense, [petitioner] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would be objectively reasonable for a party in [petitioner's] and Scripps' situation
to believe that there was a decent prospect that the accused activities would contribute,
relatively directly, to the generation of the kinds of information that are likely to be
relevant in the processes by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the product
in question.
Each of the accused activities must be evaluated separately to determine whether the
exemption applies.
[Petitioner] does not need to show that the information gathered from a particular activity
was actually submitted to the FDA. 96
It is relatively rare for the Supreme Court to deal with jury instructions. But, almost in
passing, the Supreme Court expressly approved the above instruction as consistent with the
Court's holding in this case.9 7 Because the Court has now blessed this instruction, it is likely to
have great weight with district judges fashioning jury instructions in future cases under this
statute.
The immediate result of the Court's approval of the jury instruction is that there is no
need for a new trial, and the issue on remand to the Federal Circuit will be the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the jury's verdict, applying the law as stated in the instruction and as
explained in more detail in the Supreme Court's opinion. 98

9'"It does not follow from this, however, that § 271 (e)(1)'s exemption from infringement categorically excludes

either (1) experimentation on drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission or (2) use of patented
compounds in experiments that are not ultimately submitted to the FDA. Under certain conditions, we think the
exemption is sufficiently broad to protect the use of patented compounds in both situations." Id. at 2382.
96 Id. at 2379.
"[T]he evidence presented at trial has yet to be reviewed under the standards set forth in the jury instruction,
which we believe to be consistent with, if less detailed than, the construction of § 271(e)(1) that we adopt today."
Id. at 2384.
97

"We decline to undertake a review of the sufficiency of the evidence under a proper construction of § 271(e)(1)
for the first time here. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion." Id. at 2384. On remand, the Federal Circuit issued an order returning the
case to the same panel and providing a schedule for new briefs to be filed "with particular attention paid to the
98

Supreme Court decision." IntegraLifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Telios Pharm., Inc., 02-1052,-1065, United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Order dated August 17, 2005. Somewhat surprisingly, the order sua sponte invited
amicus briefs. Ordinarily amicus briefs are filed to address issues of law and policy that may be of interest to a
constituency beyond the parties to the case. In this instance, now that the Supreme Court has decided the important
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By approving the jury instructions in this case, the Supreme Court may have sown the
seeds of difficulties in future cases. The instruction does inform the jury that to be covered by
the statute it is not necessary that the information resulting from the activity was actually
submitted to the FDA. However, aside from that one point, the instruction does not really
provide clear guidance to a jury. For example, the phrases "decent prospect," "contribute,
relatively directly," and "likely to be relevant" are vague, awkward, and will lead to jury
confusion.
The Supreme Court took pains in Merck v. Integra to set forth, in broad and strong
language, the meaning of this important statute to a jury. However, the meaning of the statute
will boil down to what is stated in the jury instruction. Unfortunately, the approved jury
instruction does not match in force or clarity the substantive discussion in the Court's decision.
This means that the hard decisions in future cases may have to be made by the trial judge in
either summary judgment rulings or in post-trial JMOL rulings, or by the Federal Circuit on
appeal.
IV. Drug Discovery after Merck v. Integra
Drug companies can be relieved that any experiments conducted after "lead"
identification appear to be exempt from infringement, so long as they can be shown to be related
to the submission of information to the FDA. This includes both clinical and pre-clinical
testing. 9 The multimillion dollar question, however, is how far back on the "road to regulatory
approval" does the exemption extend? It is clear that it extends past clinical to pre-clinical
testing, but does it go all the way back, for example, to drug discovery or to High Throughput
Screening (HTS)?
The Supreme Court's Merck v. Integra opinion suggests that it might. The Court stated
that "[t]here is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain information from the
exemption on the basis of the phase of research in which it is developed."' ' Interestingly, the
U.S. government agrees with this viewpoint. As stated in their amicus brief:
A researcher could not, however, settle on a particular compound unless it had already
run tests on that compound that revealed it to be the best candidate for use in the drug.
Thus, "screening" of compounds for use in a particular drug... is reasonably related to
the development and submission of information to FDA because it allows the researcher
to identify the appropriate compound or compounds to submit.''
legal issue that was before it regarding the scope of activities protected by 35 U.S.C.§ 271(e)(1), it is not apparent
why the Federal Circuit would welcome briefs from non-parties for this matter on remand.
'9 The Supreme Court left no doubt that preclinical testing can fall within the infringement safe harbor: "We thus
agree with the Government that the use of patented compounds in preclinical studies is protected under § 271(e)(1)
as long as there is a reasonable basis for believing that the experiments will produce 'the types of information that
are relevant to an IND or NDA.' Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae23." Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2383-84.
100 Id. at 2380 (emphasis added).
101

Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005)

(No. 03-1237), at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/3mer/i ami/2003-1237.mer.ami.pdf (last visited January 4,
2006).
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Moreover, interpreting the statute to include HTS could be considered to be consistent
with FDA practice. For example, the FDA has a procedure called a "Screening IND" that
permits a manufacturer to present multiple variants of a drug in a single IND, with a view toward
researching "a number of closely related drugs to choose the preferred compound or
formulation., 112 Thus, to the extent that drug companies choose to use the screening IND
application and submit the HTS results for several promising leads, they might thereby
strengthen their argument that HTS is included in the safe harbor.
The issue of whether HTS should be covered by the safe harbor was debated in the
amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court. For example, the American Intellectual Property
Law Association (AIPLA) amicus brief argued that "[h]igh-throughput screening techniques...
should not be considered 'reasonably related' to the development of information for the FDA." ' 3
AIPLA contended that the FDA is concerned with safety and effectiveness," 4 and noted that the
screening IND is only for closely related molecules." 5 As noted by the Federal Circuit,
"exaggerating § 271(e)(1) out of context would swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for
some categories of biotechnological inventions. '0 6
The Integra case does not squarely present the issue of whether § 271(e)(1) applies to
HTS. Scripps began with the known RGD peptide and merely improved that peptide by
cyclizing it for use as a drug and by making other minor modifications. Arguably, the Scripps
research was more akin to the lead "optimization" experiments performed once a lead is
identified in a HTS. Thus, although the case has been remanded for further consideration in light
of the proper interpretation of the statute, the decision on remand by the Federal Circuit is not
likely to provide much guidance on the question of how far back in the drug screening process
the safe harbor goes.
The question of the scope of the FDA infringement exception is important to consumers,
research-based drug companies, the biotechnology industry, and even the American economy.
The possibility of patent infringement or reach-through royalties 0 7 serves to raise drug prices,
which are felt by many consumers to be too high already. 0 8 Further, in an environment of patent
litigation and uncertain damages, drug companies may move their research facilities offshore, a

102 FDA, Manual of Policies and Procedures, Center for Drug Evaluation & Research, INDs: ScreeningINDs 1
(2001) http://www.fda.gov/cder/mapp/6030-4.pdf.
103 Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Neither Party at 20,

Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237), at
http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Issues and Advocacy/Amicus Briefs I/FOLEYHOAGAMICLJSBRIE
F.pdf ("AIPLA Brief').
104

AIPLA Brief at 20.
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AIPLA Brief at 14.

106 Integrav. Merck KGaA, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, *19 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
107

A "reach-through royalty" is a royalty on a downstream product, rather than on the patented productper se. As

an example, a royalty on a drug that was discovered with the use of a patented product, such as a patented protein or
gene, would be called a reach-through royalty.
108 Cf Although expensive, medicine is a fraction of the cost of surgery.
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trend already seen as drug companies open screening facilities in the Far East.109 As the research
moves, so do jobs. Pharmaceutical research is a $33 billion industry"0 that directly employs
more than 310,000 people." Further, as research moves, so does the American technical edge
over other countries. 112
An overly broad reading of § 271 (e)(1) could also be a serious blow to the biotechnology
industry a $30 billion a year industry that has produced some 160 drugs and vaccines, has
another 370 biotech products in clinical trials, and employs almost 200,000 people.11 3 A safe
harbor broad enough to reach initial HTS studies could potentially erode the value of many
genomic patents, whose main worth may lie in screening uses for the genes and proteins claimed
therein.
Conclusion
Although it is now clear that the FDA safe harbor is not restricted to generic drugs, and
that it includes animal as well as human studies, the precise boundary of the safe harbor has yet
to be determined. The answers will have to be provided in future cases. The handling of those
future cases may be more problematic than the Supreme Court intended, as a consequence of the
poorly drafted jury instructions approved by the Court.
As a practical matter, we can expect drug companies to begin including screening data in
their IND submissions in an attempt to push the limits of the safe harbor to the very beginning of
the drug discovery process. Meanwhile, biotech patent owners who might feel stymied by the
result in Merck v. Integra, may turn to Congress, attempting to have the boundaries of the §
271(e)(1) exemption clarified by amendment. At the same time, research and non-profit
organizations may potentially seek to have the common law research use defense codified in a
more substantial and enhanced form from the vestige remaining after the Madey decision.

109 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc. 340 F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (establishing that it is possible to import

drugs discovered in overseas screening because the § 271 (g) restriction on importation covered "products" not
information). See also, Nancy Evans, Qffshore DrugDevelopment May be Necessary to Control Cost (March 2004),
at http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/2004healthcareconf.shtml ("Between 1990 and 2000, the number of

clinical trials abroad jumped from 271 to 4,458, and the number of countries involved more than tripled
to 79.").
110 Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2004 (Washington, DC: PhRMA, 2004), at
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http://,www.phrma.org/publications/publications//2004-03-31.937.pdf.
111See, e.g., National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of IndustrialResearch
and Development: 2000 (Arlington, VA: NSF, 2000). See also, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2004 (Washington,
DC: PhRMA, 2004).
112 See also, Nancy Evans, Offshore DrugDevelopment May be Necessary to Control Cost (March 2004), at
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/2004healthcareconf.shtml (last visited January 4, 2006) ("'Forty to 60

percent of postdocs in the United States are from the PRC and Taiwan. In 10 years, there will be a reverse brain
drain in U.S. biotech. The people who will be leaving are the same people who are doing our best research here."'
(quoting Fred Volinsky, managing director of RCT BioVentures).
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The research use exceptions to patent infringement, both as stated in § 271(e)(1) or as
provided in judge-made law, will continue to be politically charged, because the result will
ultimately affect drug prices. Thus, a careful delineation of the boundaries of the safe harbor is
important to all members of the community drug manufacturers and consumers alike.
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